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The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,
which eliminated formal racial distinctions from
the law, coincided with the enactment of frame-
work civil rights legislation. Throughout the mid-
to late twentieth century, lawmakers and advocates
who pressed for immigration reform formulated
their ideas as extensions of the civil rights struggle.1
And generally speaking, the civil rights movement
has given us the vocabulary with which we frame
debates concerning justice, equality, and citizenship.
Characterizing the immigration debate as a civil
rights struggle therefore has strong intuitive appeal
for defenders of immigrants’ rights. 
But what precisely it means to connect immigra-
tion with the civil rights project is not self-evident.
The immigrant population encompasses persons
whose ties to the body politic vary considerably in
kind. “Civil rights” is itself a term with multiple
meanings. It can refer to particular legal protections
against discrimination and exploitation, as well as to
abstract principles of equality and anti-subordina-
tion, and it can be employed to evoke the civil rights
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Abstract: In considering what it means to treat immigration as a “civil rights” matter, I identify two
frameworks for analysis. The !rst, universalistic in nature, emanates from personhood and promises
non-citizens the protection of generally applicable laws and an important set of constitutional rights. The
second seeks full incorporation for non-citizens into “the people,” a composite that evolves over time
through social contestation–a process that can entail enforcement of legal norms but that revolves pri-
marily around political argument. This pursuit of full membership for non-citizens implicates a reciprocal
relationship between them and the body politic, and the interests of the polity help determine the contours
of non-citizens’ membership. Each of these frameworks has been shaped by the legal and political lega-
cies of the civil rights movement itself, but the second formulation reveals how the pursuit of immigrant
incorporation cannot be fully explained as a modern-day version of the civil rights struggle.
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movement itself and the forms of popu-
lar mobilization that de!ned that social
struggle.
When advocates or scholars invoke the
civil rights of immigrants, or charge that
the treatment of non-citizens undermines
civil rights, they might mean any number
of things. The claims could mean that the
constitutionally protected civil liberties
of immigrants have been violated, or that
immigrants have been denied the protec-
tions of generally applicable social welfare
legislation. The reference might also be
to the civil rights externalities generated
by efforts to enforce the immigration laws
–rights violations that fall disproportion-
ately on lawful permanent residents and
U.S. citizens of the same race or national
origin as the primary targets of enforce-
ment. And sometimes the appeal to civil
rights might be intended to invoke some-
thing grander–to tap into a historical
struggle for justice and inclusion by mar-
ginalized groups in order to build the moral
case for events such as the legalization of
the unauthorized population.
When invoking civil rights in immigra-
tion debates, we ought to distinguish
between two interconnected but distinct
frameworks of analysis. The !rst formu-
lation, universalistic in orientation, empha-
sizes the right of all persons to basic respect
for their dignity and to protection from
arbitrary state action. This civil rights
formulation focuses on personhood and
promises immigrants the protection of
generally applicable laws, as well as a lim-
ited but important set of constitutional
rights grounded in the fact of personhood.
The second formulation accepts the rights
that emanate from personhood as a base-
line but ultimately seeks recognition of
full membership in “the people.” “The
people,” in turn, should be understood as
taking shape over time, primarily through
social contestation, rather than by opera-
tion of universalistic norms enforceable
by courts. Whereas the personhood for-
mulation entitles non-citizens to the pro-
tection of certain rights by virtue of their
identity alone, the process of incorporation
requires taking into account the prefer-
ences and prerogatives of the existing
members of the body politic, thus impli-
cating a reciprocal relationship between
the non-citizen and the polity. This differ-
ence between what it means to be respect-
ed as a person and what it means to be
incorporated into the people reflects the
difference between civil rights as a basic
legal regime and civil rights as an ongoing
social struggle. 
I have given sustained treatment else-
where to the personhood formulation of
civil rights as it has applied in the immi-
gration context. After considering the sig-
ni!cance of personhood briefly, I there-
fore focus largely on what the de!nition
of “the people” entails. I explore the place
of non-citizens within that construct and
consider the bene!ts and limitations of
drawing from civil rights history as part
of the inquiry. 
On the one hand, immigration law de-
veloped in dialogue with the civil rights
and civil liberties movements of the 1960s
and 1970s, and meaningful similarities
exist between the circumstances of many
immigrants today and the subordinated
groups whose struggle constituted the
civil rights movement. Many poor, non-
white immigrants perform essential but
dif!cult labor, often at the mercy of the
removal laws and without full capacity to
defend their interests in the political pro-
cess. But as important as these conver-
gences might be, immigrant incorporation
and the civil rights movement also impli-
cate equities quite different in kind.
Whereas the protagonists of the civil
rights movement sought recognition of
the full citizenship guaranteed to them at
birth by the Fourteenth Amendment, im-
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that has made no preexisting commitments
to their inclusion.2 Accepting these dis-
tinctions does not mean that debates over
immigrant incorporation cannot bene!t
from application of the principles that tri-
umphed in the civil rights movement,
namely, equality and nondiscrimination on
the basis of race. Instead, the distinctions
highlight how justi!cations for immigrant
incorporation have always (properly)
taken their own shape, given the nature
of the demands made on the polity. 
Scholars have written at length about
how personhood has been mobilized to
challenge legal and social distinctions
made between citizens and aliens.3 The
literature reveals how courts, in cases
involving non-citizens, have interpreted
the constitutional provisions that protect
the rights of persons to recognize certain
universally applicable personal rights. The
due process guarantees in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of our Consti-
tution, which promote rule of law values
by restraining the government from arbi-
trary action, also have been invoked to
advance human dignity by ensuring that
persons are not deprived of basic liberty
interests without adequate legal safe-
guards. The courts similarly have under-
stood the equal protection clause as pre-
venting states (though not the federal gov-
ernment) from denying generally available
social welfare protections to at least law-
fully present non-citizens (and, in limited
circumstances, unlawfully present non-
citizens). In so doing, the courts have
highlighted how social policy goals that
also promote equality and justice can be
served by evenhanded treatment of non-
citizens.4
This regime does not operate perfectly.
Critics of the federal government’s depor-
tation policies would point to the govern-
ment’s failure to respect due process norms
and take into account humanitarian con-
cerns when enforcing the law.5 Critics of
the slew of state and local laws designed
to crack down on unauthorized immigrants
–Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement
and Safe Neighborhoods Act of 2010 
(S.B. 1070) most notorious among them–
have condemned the laws for violating the
basic civil liberties of the unauthorized
and giving rise to civil rights externalities
in the form of racial pro!ling and use of
aggressive police tactics, even against law-
fully present immigrants and citizens.6
But when fully realized in practice–when
legislatures exercise restraint in their
treatment of non-citizens, when the exec-
utive engages in proportional enforcement,
and when courts act as backstops to po-
litical actors’ excesses–the personhood
formulation meaningfully protects basic
rights of immigrants. 
Despite its relative stability in American
law, however, the personhood formulation
falls short of the sort of incorporation
reflected in the highest ambitions of the
civil rights project. As constitutional law
scholar Ruth Rubio-Marín and I have
written, “Despite the universalistic prom-
ise of a human rights discourse focused
on personhood as the source of entitle-
ment, the persistence of national sover-
eignty as an organising concept means that
rights-respecting governments need not
treat citizens and non-citizens equally.”7
Personhood today does not entitle non-
citizens to core elements of membership
in the polity: namely, the right to remain
in the United States and the right to vote.8
Personhood also does not require that ex-
isting members of the people take equal
or even meaningful regard of non-citizens’
political interests, or of their demands on
public resources and institutions. These
exclusions are justi!ed not only by the
persistence (and importance) of national
sovereignty, but also by powerful socio-
cultural norms that de!ne polities as dis-
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to one another for historical, emotional,
and practical reasons. Indeed, personhood
cannot confer the sociocultural dimensions
of full membership–goods that can take
time even for new citizens to acquire. And
thus, an understanding of the civil rights
of immigrants grounded in universal per-
sonhood norms is valuable, but it has a
particular and limited meaning. 
Determining who exactly may claim
membership in the people ultimately in-
volves ongoing political debate; perhaps
the critical feature of “the people” as a
concept is that it must be constituted over
time. To be sure, the birthright citizenship
rule of the Fourteenth Amendment recon-
stitutes the bulk of the people automati-
cally with each generation. But de!ning
the polity also involves identifying other
potential members and establishing the
terms of their full inclusion, which then
occurs at different rates along legal, polit-
ical, and social dimensions. 
To understand how these dimensions
of the nation-building enterprise unfold,
we should begin with consideration of the
very formal legal processes that de!ne
full membership. But it then will be cru-
cial to appreciate how membership can
transcend these formalities by emerging
through quotidian social interactions. It
ultimately should become clear that both
the formal and informal mechanisms of
incorporation have been shaped to some
degree by civil rights norms, but that such
norms have been elements of wider-
ranging political processes that have high-
lighted the particular challenges immigra-
tion can pose to the concept of the nation.
The conventional, albeit oversimpli!ed,
narrative of immigrant incorporation
into the people begins with legal migra-
tion, usually authorized for the bene!t of
an existing citizen or lawful resident, but
also to protect persons fleeing persecution
or other forms of disaster. A period of
legal residency follows, during which the
non-citizen may claim nearly all the rights
of citizens,9 and during which a process
of political and social acculturation pre-
sumably occurs. The process then culmi-
nates in naturalization and the former
alien’s incorporation into the range of
legal rights and nonlegal bene!ts of full
membership. This linear narrative sustains
America’s self-conception as a nation of
immigrants and offers an account of
nation-building based on an ordered tran-
sition from alien outsider to fully assimi-
lated citizen. Though debates persist over
whether permanent residents ought to be
guaranteed to all the same rights as citi-
zens, and the federal government remains
free to remove non-citizens, block their
naturalization, or otherwise discriminate
against them in the distribution of bene-
!ts,10 the instability that attends nonciti-
zen status remains limited in time, because
those on this trajectory have been selected
as eligible for ultimate incorporation.
Historically, the parameters of this nar-
rative have been de!ned as much by the
exclusion of certain groups as by a nation-
al commitment to turning immigrants into
members of the people.11 But over the
course of the twentieth century, the United
States eliminated categorical racial and
ethnic exclusions from the law through
processes that culminated in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1965,12 through
which Congress !nally abandoned the
numerical quotas that limited the admis-
sion of immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe, as well as from the “Asia-
Paci!c triangle.”13
The motivating factors for these devel-
opments were likely myriad. Typical inter-
est-group politics and intra-governmental
institutional concerns certainly shaped
congressional action; Italian, Eastern Euro-
pean, and Chinese ethnic lobbies sought to
open legal migration to their family mem-
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ment forcefully pressed its concern over
the negative implications of a discrimina-
tory immigration regime for foreign rela-
tions.15 But more idealistic references to
the civil rights movement and the ethical
and legal principles of nondiscrimination
that emanated from it also inflected debates
over whether and how to restructure the
incorporation trajectory. As scholars have
remarked, “The temporal coincidence (as
well as discursive linkage) of immigration
reform with the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is too
obvious to be missed.”16
Indeed, numerous lawmakers pursued
immigration reform by vigorously defend-
ing application of formal egalitarian norms
to the immigration code, arguing that a
person’s national origin could not de!ne
his or her eligibility for entrance into the
body politic. President Johnson, for exam-
ple, exhorted Congress in his 1964 State
of the Union to “return the United States
to an immigration policy which both serves
the national interest and continues our
traditional ideals.” He observed that “[n]o
move could more effectively reaf!rm our
fundamental belief that a man is to be
judged–and judged exclusively, on his
worth as a human being.”17 And in an
April 1965 speech on immigration legisla-
tion, Vice President Hubert Humphrey was
even more concrete, noting that “[w]e
want to bring our immigration law into
line with the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.”18 The politics as well as the achieve-
ments of the civil rights movement thus
helped make the legal framework for im-
migrant incorporation both more open
and stable. By removing the taint of racial
preference from the law, the reforms of
1965 transformed the people as a concept
into a body composed without regard to
ancestry or race–a signi!cant civil rights
advancement.19
At the same time, while these shifts re-
sulted in a more egalitarian code at a formal
level, as well as tangible bene!ts for cer-
tain existing citizens and residents, the ide-
alism the reforms embodied grew largely
out of a desire to promote American virtue
by aligning the legal system with the
nation’s developing self-conception as
incompatible with racially de!ned citizen-
ship, not from a particular vision of the
membership claims of non-citizens. The
reforms, accordingly, were process-orient-
ed and did not occasion an especially broad
or deep popular debate about how Amer-
ican society ought to use its exclusion
powers to constitute the people. More
important, despite its civil rights “perfec-
tionism,” the conventional narrative can-
not fully account for how “the people”
actually have taken shape. Today, at least
two trends in immigration law compli-
cate the account of nation-building: the
increased turn to legal but temporary labor
migration and the rise of a population of
unauthorized immigrants numbering in
the millions. Though non-citizens in each
category typically enter without any ex-
pectation of ultimate incorporation, their
interests can mature into valid claims to
membership, the legal foundations for
which can be elusive. If we focus on un-
authorized immigrants, in particular, it
becomes clear that we must move beyond
legal formalities to understand what con-
stituting the people entails. It becomes
necessary to traf!c in sociological judg-
ments and appreciate a far less ordered
and more fluid understanding of nation-
building than the step-by-step conven-
tional narrative allows.
An appreciation of the fluidity of the
people actually appears in constitutional
doctrine, albeit in an underdeveloped way.
Two insights characterize the courts’
reflections. First, not all persons within
the United States or subject to the reach
of U.S. law are part of the people, but the
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zenry. And second, membership can turn
on the extent of one’s earned connection
to American society and may not be merely
a function of legal status (though the birth-
right citizenship rule does make member-
ship a matter of happenstance for the vast
majority of the polity).20 In United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court fa-
mously expressed these ideas, suggesting
that certain non-citizens possessed “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their
persons” and thus the right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” as
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
The Court referred to the people as “a
class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise devel-
oped suf!cient connection with this coun-
try to be considered part of that commu-
nity.”21 In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court
conceptualized non-citizens’ rights simi-
larly, as existing along a trajectory de!ned
by the degree of connection to the United
States: 
[T]he alien . . . has been accorded a generous
and ascending scale of rights as he increases
identity with our society. Mere lawful pres-
ence in the country creates an implied assur-
ance of safe conduct and gives him certain
rights; they become more extensive and
secure when he makes preliminary decla-
ration of intention to become a citizen, and
they expand to those of full citizenship upon
naturalization.22
In other words, the Court has on some
occasions articulated a concept of “the
people” that entails earned membership
but that does not necessarily map onto
formal legal status–a concept legal scholar
Hiroshi Motomura has called “immigra-
tion as af!liation.”23
The lower courts similarly have explored
this sociological approach to de!ning
membership, most recently in cases con-
cerning whether the federal law that pro-
hibits unauthorized aliens from possess-
ing !rearms violates the Second Amend-
ment “right of the people to keep and bear
arms.” On the one hand, no court appears
to have struggled to uphold the statutory
provision as consistent with the govern-
ment’s interest in regulating !rearms.
But the cases have provided occasion to
explore how the people differ from per-
sons as subjects of the Constitution. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, expressed reluctance to limit the
people protected by the Second Amend-
ment to citizens24–a reluctance that ap-
pears to have been driven by the desire to
maintain consistency in meaning across
constitutional provisions, as well as by
intuitions concerning the validity of cer-
tain non-citizens’ claims to membership
in some sort of American collective. In re-
solving the case before it, the Tenth Circuit
observed that the unauthorized alien chal-
lenging the gun control law may well have
belonged to the national community, by
virtue of having “been here for decades and
nowhere else.”25 As a consequence, the
court subjected the elimination of his right
by federal law to intermediate scrutiny,
the form of judicial review invoked when
signi!cant interests or protected classes
of persons are at issue. Similarly, a dissent-
ing judge in a case decided by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals premised his con-
clusions even more squarely on an af!lia-
tion model, suggesting that a person, by
virtue of simply having taken certain
actions–living in the country for eighteen
months, paying rent, supporting a family,
and generally accepting social obligations
to employers, his landlord, and his family
–could claim to be part of the people. For
this judge, one could accept societal obli-
gations without complying with the immi-
gration laws.26 The sociological reality of
the individual’s life was what determined
his membership.27
Of course, despite its ruminations, the
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ing that Congress had good reason to
keep !rearms out of the possession of per-
sons present unlawfully, in part because
of their inherent untrustworthiness.28
But these Second Amendment cases still
suggest that de!ning the people entails a
competitive dynamic that demands con-
sideration of the contributions made and
risks posed by those seeking incorpora-
tion, and not just their legal status. The
judges’ reasoning highlights the fluidity
of the concept of the people and the bal-
ancing of individual and social equities
that goes into its de!nition. Embedded in
the discussion of formal categories is thus
a dialogue about who the Constitution,
and the people themselves, might regard
as complete members of the polity. 
The unauthorized immigrant presents
a particularly stark challenge to the formal
mechanisms for de!ning membership.
He embodies a collision between the sov-
ereigntist belief in the state’s ability to
control the nation’s composition by lay-
ing out ex ante procedures for incorpora-
tion and the notion of earned member-
ship.29 As legal scholar Linda Bosniak
has explored, the unauthorized immigrant
has long had a dual identity in American
consciousness as both an outsider to and
a member of the national community.30
This duality reflects ambivalence about
the membership of the unauthorized–
ambivalence that appears even in cases
regarded as victories for immigrants’
rights. In Plyler v. Doe, for example,31
rather than squarely address the claims to
social status of unauthorized immigrants,
Justice Brennan emphasized the unau-
thorized child’s lack of blame32 and the
social policy implications of unequal treat-
ment. In his explanation for his holding,
Justice Brennan combined a commit-
ment to an anti-subordination vision of
equality with recognition of the social ills
that would result from such inequality,
emphasizing that: 
Denial of education to some isolated group
of children poses an affront to one of the
goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the
abolition of governmental barriers present-
ing unreasonable obstacles on the basis of
individual merit. . . .The inestimable toll of
that deprivation on the social, economic, in-
tellectual, and psychological well-being of
the individual . . . makes it most dif!cult to
reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-
based denial of basic education with the
framework embodied in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. . . . We cannot ignore the signi!-
cant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb
the values and skills upon which our social
order rests.33
His approach thus underscores that the
dif!cult question of whether to legally
incorporate unauthorized immigrants
cannot be answered exclusively as a mat-
ter of individual right. Instead, it must be
the subject of political contestation that
involves the weighing of social equities. 
This contestation has been an ongoing
feature of the political process, at least since
the late 1970s, when members of Congress
(and then the Reagan administration)
began grappling with whether and how to
legalize the existing population of unau-
thorized immigrants. Among the goals of
reformers a generation ago was to bring
the formal membership regime in line with
a more sociological conception similar 
to the one described above. The debates
culminated in the Immigration Reform
Control Act of 1986, which acknowledged
millions of unauthorized immigrants as
functional members of American society
by creating legal paths to their eventual
citizenship (albeit in exchange for a re-
doubled commitment to enforcement). 
And yet, whatever consensus might have
existed at the time concerning the criteria
for membership, it was short-lived.34
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izations occur as a matter of course, in the
United States the debate over the moral
and social status of unauthorized immi-
grants recurs. Today we are living through
yet another period of heightened debate
over who constitutes the people and what
it might mean for unauthorized immi-
grants to claim membership in the polity,
with persistent ambivalence still framing
the debate. 
The national-level legislation that would
be required to resolve the status of the
current unauthorized population has at-
tracted meaningful support in recent years
within Congress and among the public at
large, but its passage has proven elusive.
Perhaps the most vivid examples today of
the ambivalence that stands in the way of
a resolution are the voluminous and con-
flicting state and local efforts to address
illegal immigration. As I have discussed
at length elsewhere, this activity, which
simultaneously treats illegal immigration
as a social scourge and seeks to make it
“functional,” reflects the polity’s pro-
tracted consideration of whether to regard
unauthorized immigrants as de facto
members, or as false claimants to society’s
respect.35 This debate, percolating in a
decentralized fashion, has been funda-
mentally about whether an alien’s lack of
legal status amounts to a technicality that
can be !xed by formally recognizing socio-
logical membership, or whether the fact
of illegality defeats the legitimacy of a
person’s claim to membership.36
The fortunes of the Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors (dream)
Act, the legislation !rst proposed in 2001
to provide unauthorized youth who meet
certain conditions a path to lawful status
and citizenship, also highlight the dif!culty
of achieving popular consensus. The claims
of the affected youth, whose unlawful
status initially resulted from the choices
of others, might seem to present an easy
moral case for incorporation. The fact that
most of the would-be bene!ciaries of the
dream Act are also functional Americans
who have been socialized by our institu-
tions would seem to establish the sort of
commonality and connectedness that
should make the granting of legal status
an afterthought.37 And yet the dream Act
has languished in Congress, stymied in part
by concern that rewarding illegal behavior
would create perverse incentives for future
illegal immigration. 
But even as these examples of law reform
reflect deep public disagreement, most
participants in the debate over the mem-
bership status of the unauthorized share
one basic assumption: that it is not ten-
able to maintain a large unauthorized pop-
ulation embedded in the nation’s social
structures, because illegality has corrosive
effects, whether on society or the immi-
grants themselves. For those who believe
unauthorized status disquali!es non-citi-
zens from membership, legal recognition
remains anathema, and some combination
of enforcement measures and imposition
of legal disabilities becomes attractive as
a means of reducing if not eliminating the
population. But for those like me, who
accept the premise that many of the un-
authorized constitute members sociolog-
ically speaking, the imperative becomes to
turn the ambivalence that has character-
ized the debate into broad support for legal
recognition through legislation, to stabi-
lize and anchor the social fact of mem-
bership.38
In 2013, the country may be on the verge
of expanding its membership rules in
dramatic fashion. Any immigration legis-
lation that does emerge likely will be the
product of partisan and interest group
trade-offs, and support for legalization in
particular will continue to be built by ap-
peals to the self-interest of politicians and
the polity alike. But one of the lessons of







Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Rodriguez  6/4/2013  8:41 AM  Page 8
ideas can also matter–especially ideas that
embody basic American values. In his ac-
count of what !nally prompted Congress
to enact the legalization program in 1986,
legal scholar Peter Schuck contends that
the standard pluralist model of the leg-
islative process cannot explain the dra-
matic and expansionist policy adopted.
He cites instead the power of ideas and
values that “can precede interests as well
as advance them,” contending that popu-
lar assumptions about the bene!ts of eth-
nic diversity and family uni!cation, and the
belief that human rights, civil liberties,
and due process norms should govern
our treatment of even illegal immigrants,
“helped to galvanize a consensus around
an expansive immigration policy.”39
The enactment of a legalization program
today thus may depend on advocates and
lawmakers turning the sociological factors
suggestive of the unauthorized immi-
grant’s actual membership into political
arguments grounded in appeals to fair-
ness, justice, and social welfare.40 These
arguments might call back to the para-
digmatic civil rights movement, but they
must also engage the unique membership
questions posed by legalization. In its
recent decision striking down most of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the Supreme Court
identi!ed certain positive equities that
might be entertained, including “whether
the alien has children born in the United
States, long ties to the community, or a
record of distinguished military service.”41
These considerations parallel the factors
scholars and activists have long high-
lighted, most common among them length
of presence, extent of ties to the country,
and existence of a criminal record42–
factors that combine notions of fairness
and dessert with an assessment of the ex-
isting polity’s interests. Presence and ties
appear to stand in as proxies for de facto
membership, de!ned in part by the extent
of the non-citizen’s contribution, as well
as the potential disruption to his or her
life or the lives of others that might attend
an uprooting. And emphasis on criminal
conduct reflects either an intuition that
we ought to choose only members of good
moral character, or a belief that past con-
duct can serve as evidence of the individ-
ual’s respect for the society into which he
seeks incorporation. 
Also relevant to the gestalt is the basis
for the individual’s “illegality”: whether it
arose because of a largely unconstrained
choice, as a response to persecution or
deprivation, or because of the choice of
another, such as a parent.43 This question
requires interrogating our assumptions
about illegality to determine whether it is
best understood as an administrative vio-
lation, or whether it in fact reflects bad
character or a moral transgression that
obscures the equities in the non-citizen’s
favor.44 These questions, in turn, might
prompt consideration of unauthorized im-
migrants’ motives, such as whether their
actions reflect a desire for self-improve-
ment and a willingness to work, or some
less creditable motives. The legitimacy of
these motives will be connected to the ex-
tent of the existing polity’s own “blame”
for illegal immigration45–a complicity no
less real because of the dif!culty of quan-
tifying it, or ascribing it to individual
choices rather than systemic factors, such
as allocation of enforcement resources or
failure to properly channel economic and
demographic pressures. 
And !nally, the transformation of the
sociological case into a political claim for
legal recognition requires consideration
of incorporation’s likely effects on exist-
ing citizens and future iterations of the
polity, including the possibility that in-
corporation would weaken the status of
the least well-off and create incentives for
future illegal immigration, which in turn
would compound these negative effects.46
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ing with the question of whether the
interests of the existing polity ought to
take primacy over the interests of those
seeking incorporation.47 It should not be
enough to assume in a nationalistic vein
that the impact on existing citizens should
always take precedence, at least not if
that impact is more perceived than real,
or if means of ameliorating the impact
while also accounting for the interests of
non-citizens can be identi!ed. But failure
to take into account the costs of incorpo-
ration for existing members would cir-
cumvent the reciprocal dimension of
membership important to the long-term
stability of the nation-building project.
An argument for the sociological mem-
bership of unauthorized immigrants that
in turn justi!es their legal recognition as
part of the people ultimately demands an
unwieldy balancing of interests. The incor-
poration debate thus must revolve around
the particular circumstances that de!ne it.
The conventional narrative casts a very
long shadow over this debate, because the
existing legal mechanisms of incorpora-
tion are perceived to be neutral and fair.
But placing this narrative in proper histor-
ical perspective requires acknowledging
its formal limitations and unintended con-
sequences. The underlying premises of
legalization are necessarily that the formal
legal regime has failed and must be brought
into line with the complex social structures
that de!ne actual membership, and that
this realignment will promote equality and
fairness while offsetting future social dys-
function. In the end, this vision of a better
integrated society ties the immigration
debate to the civil rights movement and
the core commitments of the American
polity, even as the vision depends on under-
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